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Abstract
Annotation reproducibility and accuracy rely on good consistency
within annotators. We propose a novel method for measuring within
annotator consistency or annotator Intraobserver Agreement (IA). The
proposed approach is based on transitivity, a measure that has been
thoroughly studied in the context of rational decision-making. The
transitivity measure, in contrast with the commonly used test-retest
strategy for annotator IA, is less sensitive to the several types of bias
introduced by the test-retest strategy. We present a representation the-
orem to the effect that relative judgement data that meet transitivity
can be mapped to a scale (in terms of measurement theory). We also
discuss a further application of transitivity as part of data collection
design for addressing the problem of the quadratic complexity of data
collection of relative judgements.
1 Introduction
Annotation reliability plays a pivotal role in data reliability. Krippendorff,
in his prominent book Krippendorff (1980), delineates three type of reliabil-
ity, that is, stability, reproducibility and accuracy. Although IA is strictly
speaking a measure of stability, it plays an essential role in reproducibility,
which is measured by the Inter-Annotator Agreement (IAA) and accuracy,
which is measured calculating the deviations from a given standard. Both
reproducibility and accuracy are negatively affected by a low IA.
The standard method for calculating IA is the test-retest strategy, which
is based on the resubmission, after some time, of some items to the annota-
tors. That is, a annotator has to re-assess the same items after some time
has elapsed. The comparison of the annotations of the same items provides
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a measure of the annotator consistency. Test-retest strategy is a measure
of the consistency of each of the annotators with themselves over the time,
which has the drawback of being time and money consuming. Furthermore,
as suggested by Krippendorff (1980, p. 215) test-retest strategy can increase
various types of bias which are not strictly related to the annotation task,
such as: carelessness, openness to distractions, or the tendency to relax per-
formance standards when tired. All of which are amplified by the increase
of the annotation time.
In this paper we introduce a new measure of IA based on the concept of
transitivity. Such a measure can be used in the case of relative annotations
but not in the case of absolute annotations. We recall that, in absolute an-
notations, human annotators are asked to annotate an item based on some
default ranking or Likert scale. For example, in the case of NLG evaluation,
this could involve measuring the grammaticality of a sentence, rating it with
a number between 1 to 5. In relative annotations, the human annotators
are asked to asses the preference between the subjects under analysis based
on some criteria. For example, in the case of NLG evaluation, this could
involve choosing between two sentences based on a grammatical preference
judgement. Absolute annotations have the advantage of sup-porting a more
fine-grained analysis, for example by using numeric scales, which is not im-
mediately accessible to relative annotations. However, relative annotations,
besides having the convenience of being more intuitive and quicker than ab-
solute annotation Carterette et al. (2008), have some features which make
them very attractive. Firstly, relative annotations allows us to attain higher
IAA than absolute annotation does (Jekaterina et al., 2018; Belz and Kow,
2010). Secondly, in the case of NLG evaluation, absolute annotations, al-
though designed to assess the quality of a system, are often used to compare
quality across systems. As we showed in Section 5, absolute annotations
can be obtained, under some conditions, from relative annotations in a con-
structive way.
This work is a working in progress, and it presents the theoretical con-
struction of our paradigm. Future developed are presented in the Section
7.
2 Related work
In this paper, we suggest considering a new kind of annotator consistency in
the case of annotations based on preference choice, as for instance in relative
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judgments evaluations. We propose to use the property of transitivity as a
measure of annotation stability. To the best of our knowledge this is an
original contribution. However, several papers inspired our proposal.
The idea of transitivity as a measure of consistency is not new and can
be found for example in Siegel and Castellan (1988).
The classical concept of rationality as defined in Decision Theory (see for
example Luce and Raiffa (1957)), use the property of transitivity as basic
for the concept of rational preferences. Following classical Decision Theory,
rational preferences have to be transitive. Due to the fact that transitivity
is ordinal in nature, our proposal is introduced with regard to relative an-
notation methodologies. Some advantages of using relative annotations in-
stead of absolute annotations are presented, for example, by Carterette et al.
(2008), Belz and Kow (2010) and Jekaterina et al. (2018). As shown in
Carterette et al. (2008) and Belz and Kow (2010), such methodologies are
more intuitive and quicker than absolute annotations. Furthermore, as
shown in Jekaterina et al. (2018) and Belz and Kow (2010), relative anno-
tations reach a higher IAA than absolute annotations. Recently preferences
annotations have been investigated as an alternative to absolute annota-
tions in the areas of machine translation and information retrieval systems:
see for examples, Vilar et al. (2007), Rorvig (1990), Carterette et al. (2008),
Song et al. (2011) and Bashir et al. (2013).
Finally, taking inspiration from Measurement theory (Roberts, 1985)
we show how to infer absolute annotations from relative annotations. A
similar result was introduced by Rorvig (1990) using the concept of Simple
Scalability. Whereas the Simple Scalability uses the property of transitivity,
substitutibility and independence, the representation theorem we present
uses transitivity and completeness.
3 Using transitivity to measure IA
The test-retest strategy is aimed at determining what we can refer to as
logical consistency. If an annotator prefers subject i1 over subject i2 then
(s)he is not consistent if at the same time (s)he prefer subject i2 over subject
i1. From a more general point of view, we can state that an annotator is
inconsistent if his(her) claims are not compatible with each other, where this
incompatibility can be also of a different nature than the logical one. For ex-
ample, given the subjects i1, i2 and i3, the following claims are incompatible
between them:
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1. i1 is preferred to i2;
2. i2 is preferred to i3;
3. i3 is preferred to i1.
The property in question is known as transitivity. Given the subjects i1,
i2 and i3, transitivity states that if i1 is preferred to i2, and i2 is preferred
to i3, then i1 is preferred to i3. In classical decision theory (see for exam-
ple, Luce and Raiffa (1957)), transitivity plays a pivotal role in defining the
concept of rational preference under the normative interpretation. Indeed,
following this interpretation, a rational man should make judgments that
are transitive. Although transitivity has raised several discussions about its
adequacy as a property of rationality, see for example Fishburn (1982) and
Regenwetter et al. (2011), we believe that it can be safely used as a measure
of the annotators’ internal consistency.
It is important to say that, in the annotation tasks that we are interested
in this paper, annotators have to assess items based on the same criteria. For
instance, suppose that the annotation consists of relative annotations about
the sentences s1, s2 and s3. It could happen that an annotator prefers
sentence s1 to sentence s2 and sentence s2 to sentence s3, based on the
sentences’ grammaticality, and at the same time sentence s3 to s1, based on
the sentences’ fluency. However, in this case, the annotator is assessing the
quality of the three sentences based on different criteria, which compromises
the object of the specific evaluation. For example, evaluating which system
generated grammatically better sentences. Note that because our use of
transitivity assumes that preferences are made using constant fixed criteria,
where the annotation criteria are very general (e.g. overall quality) and
prone to unstable interpretation, our measure is less appropriate.
As the above example highlights, the property of transitivity can be used
to assess the IA. Indeed, let us suppose that we have a not-transitive prefer-
ence in an evaluation about grammaticality. So, in this case, an annotator
declares that s1 is more grammatical than s2, s2 is more grammatical than
s3 but s3 is more grammatical than s1. In this case we cannot reach consis-
tent conclusions about the grammaticality of the sentences s1, s2 and s3. If
there are many inconsistencies in the annotator’s preferences, this weakens
the basis for comparing systems based on those preferences.
Differently from the test-retest strategy, transitivity is part of a single
test/annotation scenario, which reduces the cost of the annotation. It can
also reduce subjective bias linked to the time elapsed, for instance, the
tendency to relax performance standards when tired. This is especially
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true in a procedure that resubmits the items during the same annotation.1
Such a procedure made use of the annotator’s time to judge again items
already annotated. When using the transitivity we can directly measure the
IA by taking triplets of subjects for which annotators have given pairwise
preferences during the annotation. In this case we can save the time and
the money usually involved in the second annotation.
Additionally, the property of transitivity can play an important role
in the area of evaluation of NLG systems. As we show in the Section 5,
transitivity can be used, alongside the property of completeness2, to obtain
absolute annotations from relative annotations.
3.1 How to calculate the IA with transitivity
Preference annotation can be strict or weak. In strict preference annotation,
given two subjects i1 and i2, the annotator is requested to express one and
only one of the following preference: either i1 is preferred to i2 or i2 is
preferred to i1. In the case of weak preference the two alternatives can be
chosen together, that is, i1 is preferred to i2 and i2 is preferred to i1. In
this case an annotator expresses equal preference between the two subjects.
In this section we consider the case of weak preference, which gives more
freedom to the annotators. Indeed, in the case of strict preference, the
annotators are forced to give a preference, as well as a case when they do
not have a clear preference between two subjects. In order to measure the
transitivity, all the judgements are performed within pairwise preferences of
triplets of subjects i1, i2 and i3. That is, (i1, i2), (i1, i3) and (i2, i3).
The standard methods used for measuring IAA and IA can be used in our
case. Since the pivotal work of Carletta (1996), kappa coefficients K are used
for measuring annotation agreement. Using the more general formulation,
as given by Carletta (1996), the kappa coefficient K can be expressed with
the following formulation:
K =
P (A)− P (E)
1− P (E)
1In a preference annotation task we are interested in, an item is made by a couple of
subjects from which annotators have to express a preference.
2This property ensures that, given two subjects i1 and i2, if i1 is different from i2 then
the annotator has to prefer i1 over i2 or i2 over i1 or can express indifference preference
between i1 or i2. Given the finiteness of the set of sentences to be assessed, although the
total number of the sentences to be split between the annotators can be quite large, the
completeness seems a reasonable requirement for annotation tasks.
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where P (A) is the proportion of times the annotators agree, whereas P (E)
is the proportion of times the annotators would be expected to agree by
chance. In our case, the IA is calculated for each annotator based on each
triplet of items between which (s)he have to express his(her) preferences.
Consequently, P (A) is the proportion of times that the annotator is tran-
sitive, and P (E) is the proportion of times that s(he) would be transitive
by chance, that is 0.48. Such a number is calculated by counting the pro-
portion of times the annotator is transitive by chance versus not transitive
by chance. In a preference annotation task, given two subjects i1 and i2,
an annotator can express three preferences: i1 is preferred to i2 (in symbol
i1 < i2), i2 is preferred to i1 (in symbol i2 < i1) or i1 and i2 are equally
preferred (in symbol i2 ∽ i1). For the sake of simplicity, let us merge the
symbols < and ∽ in the symbol .. Given three subjects i1, i2 and i3 there
are eight possible preference judgements.
1. i1 . i2 and i2 . i3 and i1 . i3.
2. i1 . i2 and i3 . i2 and i1 . i3.
3. i1 . i2 and i2 . i3 and i3 . i1.
4. i1 . i2 and i3 . i2 and i3 . i1.
5. i2 . i1 and i2 . i3 and i1 . i3.
6. i2 . i1 and i3 . i2 and i1 . i3.
7. i2 . i1 and i2 . i3 and i3 . i1.
8. i2 . i1 and i3 . i2 and i3 . i1.
We note that for each preference above the symbol . have two meaning.
Indeed, it can be interpreted either as < or ∽. Consequently, each of the
eight points above can be split into 8 different combinations of < or ∽. This
means that we have 64 possible combinations at the end. Over these we get
37 repetitions. For example, from both the point 1 and 2 we get the prefer-
ences: i1 < i2 and i2 ∽ i3 and i1 < i3. There are 13 transitive assessments
left out of 27 possibilities. That is, 13/27 = 0.48 is the probability that an
annotator is transitive by chance.
We note that in the case of strict preference the value of P (E) has to
be considered 0.75. Indeed, by using the same methodology we can see that
there is a total of 6 transitive assessments out of 8. Indeed, if we only use the
symbol < we can see that only points 3 and 6 are not transitive. This fact
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makes our measure not suitable for the case of strict preferences. We note
that this can explain the conclusion reached by Hui and Berberich (2017),
where strict preference is considered transitive across annotators, whereas
weak preference is considered not transitive.
Let us give an example of how to calculate the IA. We remind that, in
order to measure the transitivity, all the judgements are performed within
pairwise preferences of triplets of subjects i1, i2 and i3. Suppose the anno-
tation is performed by three annotators A1, A2 and A3 on the triplets of
items (i1, i2, i3), (i4, i5, i6) and (i7, i8, i9). This mean that annotators have
to give preference between the pairwise of subjects in the triplets (i1, i2, i3),
(i4, i5, i6) and (i7, i8, i9). Table 1 reports the artificial annotations. The
Annotator (i1, i2, i3) (i4, i5, i6) (i7, i8, i9)
A1 T T T
A2 T NT T
A3 NT T NT
Table 1: Annotators’ preference assessment. T means transitive preferences
and NT means non transitive preferences.
annotators’ IA are reported in the last column of Table 2.
Annotator P (A) P (E) K
A1 3/3 0.48 1
A2 2/3 0.48 0.34
A3 1/3 0.48 -0.28
Table 2: Annotators’ IA. We remind that K values range from 1 (perfect
agreement) to -1.
4 The use of transitivity in experimental design
The transitivity property can also be considered from a normative point of
view, as in Decision Theory. This allows thinking about it as a condition
to guarantee a specific idea of annotators’ consistency as stability. In this
case transitivity is not used to check the annotators’ internal consistency,
but rather it is assumed. Of course, we may only want to make such an
assumption based on evidence. For instance, we can first test annotators’
consistency on a sample of our dataset. Once we have established consistency
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on the sample (or eliminated inconsistent annotators), we can then work
with the assumption of consistency for the remaining data – this practice is
also common when it comes to the application of IAA.
If we assume consistency, we can drastically reduce the number of an-
notations we request from annotators. As an example, we can imagine an
interactive software which removes the couple, whose order can be deducted
from the assessment done before, from the set of couples. For instance, com-
ing back to the example with the three sentences s1, s2 and s3, let’s suppose
that an annotator prefers sentence s1 over sentence s2 and sentence s2 over
sentence s3. Then, in this case, the software does not present the couple of
sentences s1 and s3 and infers from the annotation before that the annota-
tor prefers sentence s1 over sentence s3. This annotation task design, be-
sides guaranteeing the transitivity of the evaluation, allows us to reduce the
problem of the quadratically explosion of the possible alternatives, which is
present in the relative annotation evaluation (Carterette et al., 2008). This
has the advantage of reducing the time required to complete the annotation.
5 From relative to absolute human annotations
Inspired by Measurement Theory (Roberts, 1985), in this section, we show
how to extract absolute annotations from relative annotations.
Let us begin by giving a definition.
Definition 1 Let A be a set. A binary relation R on A is:
Strongly complete if for each a, b ∈ A such that a 6= b, aRb or bRa;
Transitive if aRb and bRc then aRc, for each a, b, c ∈ A.
An example of strongly complete relation is the strict order (<) between
natural numbers.
It is commonly believed that it is possible to measure some entity if
we can associate, in a default fashion, a number to it. More generally, in
order to measure a set of entities, we would like to have a function which
associated with each of them a real number. For example, given a set of
people, suppose we are interested in measuring their weight. In this case
we would like to have a tool, for instance a weight scale, which associates a
number with each person of the set in a compact manner. Such number will
be interpreted as the weight of that person. Suppose now we are interested
in measuring the weight of those people, instead of associating a number
with them, by ordering them from the lightest to the heaviest. Both of the
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approaches are informative about the weight of the people. The questions
that arises are: Are these two approaches correlated? How do they correlate?
A goal of Measurement Theory is to explain under which conditions it is
possible to answer these questions. The general idea is to find properties
(technically called axioms) satisfied by the order, such that it is possible
to define a numerical function which mirrors the order. The proof that
sanctions this result is called a representation theorem. Theorem 1 is an
example of representation theorem.
Theorem 1 Let A be a set and R a binary relation on A. There exist a
real function f on A which, for each a, b ∈ A, satisfies the following:
aRb if and only if f(a) ≥ f(b)
if and only if R is transitive and strongly complete.
Although we do not report the proof, which can be found in (Roberts, 1985,
p. 107), we present the construction of f . The function f is defined as
follows:
f(x) = the number of y in A such that xRy.
In words, f counts how many times an element in A is preferred to some
other element in A which is related by R. An example can illustrate this
definition. Let A be the set {a, b, c} and let R be the set {(a, b), (a, c), (b, c)}
then f is defined by:
f(a) = 2; (a, b), (a, c)
f(b) = 1; (b, c)
f(c) = 0.
The function f can be interpreted as absolute annotation. We note
that any linear transformations of f satisfy Theorem 1. For example, each
natural number n different from 0, f · n satisfies Theorem 1. Given its
construction, we suggest using the f as presented above to be considered as
absolute annotation derived from a relative one.
6 Limits of the present proposal
We have shown some advantages of the property of transitivity as a measure
of IA. Let us now present a couple of the limits of our proposal.
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On one hand, the use of transitivity as a measure of IA can be used only
in the case of relative annotations, whereas it cannot be used for absolute an-
notations. Although several papers (see for example Jekaterina et al. (2018),
Belz and Kow (2010) and Carterette et al. (2008)) demonstrate advantages
of relative over absolute annotations, the latter are used much more widely.
Additionally, as we observed in Section 3, one limit is linked to the fuzziness
of the criterion annotated. As with the sorites paradox (or the paradox of
the heap), this problem arises from vague predicates. If the criterion is too
general then transitivity can fail due to the differences in the aspect used by
the annotators to assess different items. This cannot be strictly considered
as a failure of annotator internal consistency as stability.
7 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have introduced a new approach for checking the annota-
tor IA. Inspired by the concept of rational preference as defined in classical
decision theory, we suggested using the property of transitivity to check the
annotators’ stability. We presented some advantages introduced by the con-
cept of transitivity with respect to the test-retest strategy, among which the
possibility of using some results from Measurement Theory to constructively
derive absolute annotations from relative annotations is present. Further-
more, from a normative point of view, assuming transitivity can allow for
more efficient collection of human annotations (avoiding the quadratic explo-
sion of annotations that would otherwise be required) as observed originally
by Carterette et al. (2008) in the context of relevance annotations for infor-
mation retrieval.
This paper presents the theoretical construction of our paradigm. Future
developments consist of:
1. An extensive study and evaluation of our theoretical ideas;
2. the use of possible weight in the preference annotation, representing
the intensity of annotators’ preference.
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